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Canada 
According to the two-stage model of causal reasoning (Fugelsang & Thompson, 
2003), people automatically recruit their pre-existing beliefs when evaluating causal 
judgments. The current study investigates the effect of content in reducing the belief-bias 
effect in causal reasoning. The belief-bias was measured using the standard causal paradigm 
and in addition, the problems were divided equally into the following conditions: mental 
health, physical health, positive, and negative content. It was hypothesized that the belief-
bias effect would be attenuated for the problems with negative content and mental health 
content because they are assumed to restrict the automatic recruitment of beliefs. This 
hypothesis was partially supported. It was found that the belief-bias effect was attenuated in 
the negative condition when compared to the positive condition, as expected. There was no 
difference in the magnitude of the belief-bias effect between the two health type conditions. 
Several explanations of the contrasting results are discussed. 
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Can the Magnitude of the Belief-Bias in Causal Reasoning be Attenuated 
Through the Manipulation of Problem Content? 
Imagine the following scenario: You have had a long day at work, are very tired, and 
have not yet eaten. Above all else you may be coming down with a cold. However, it is your 
best friend's birthday and she is having a get together at her house that evening. Despite how 
you feel, you decide to make an appearance at the party and have a few drinks. At the party 
there are several appetizers to choose from. You begin by eating the usual items you know 
you like, and then decide to try something novel and slurp down a juicy raw oyster. Later that 
evening, you become very ill. What caused the illness? The seemingly obvious answer would 
be that you became ill from eating the oyster. However, there are several other factors that 
may have also caused or contributed to the illness, such as being physically run down, 
consuming alcohol, or eating other non-novel foods that were contaminated (e.g., the 
mayonnaise in the finger sandwiches could have gone bad). 
The above scenario illustrates why the study of causal reasoning is so important. 
Theoretically, it is important to identify the mechanisms and processes involved in coming to 
a causal conclusion. For example, why does eating the oyster stand out as the logical cause of 
the sudden illness? There are also practical consequences to the study of causal reasoning and 
these consequences have a profound influence on future behaviour. For example, you may 
decide never to eat oysters again, even though the oyster may not have been the actual cause 
of the illness. Or, you may have attributed the illness to the mayonnaise and started to restrict 
your diet to avoid the condiment. In either case, your diet and food preferences would 
change, depending on what you decided was the cause of becoming ill. 
What is Causal Reasoning ? 
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Causal reasoning is a sophisticated, high-level cognitive activity by which cause-and-
effect judgments are made. In other words, causal reasoning is an inductive process by which 
people determine a cause (or causes) for a given effect (Heit, 2007; Novick & Cheng, 2004; 
Schustack & Sternberg, 1981; Sloman, 2005). People make numerous cause-and-effect 
judgments everyday, and as the example above illustrates, these judgments, more likely than 
not, will have important implications for future behaviour. Because the ability to make 
accurate and effective cause-and-effect judgments is so important, cognitive psychologists 
have exerted considerable effort in examining the mechanisms and processes underlying this 
cognitive ability (e.g., Buehner, 2005; Downing, Sternberg, & Ross, 1983; Cheng, 1987; 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000, 2003; Fugelsang, Thompson, & 
Dunbar, 2006; White, 1989 ). 
The fact that people make cause-and-effect judgments quickly and (computationally) 
efficiently implies that a systematic process is used to make such judgments. However, most 
systematic cognitive processes are not perfect and are accompanied by errors. In the area of 
causal reasoning, several types of errors have been reported. The illusory correlation is one 
example of such an error and stems from the tendency to overestimate the frequency with 
which two events co-occur (Baron, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). For example, nausea 
is often a symptom of the flu; however, not all cases of nausea co-occur with the flu virus. 
The confirmation bias is another example of a systematic error in causal reasoning. The 
confirmation bias is simply the tendency to endorse causal conclusions that are believable, or 
the endorsement of conclusions that are consistent with one's belief about the causal 
relationship (Baron, 1988; Evans & Feeney, 2004). For example, if people believe that the flu 
shot will give them the flu, they will likely endorse the conclusion as such, or discount the 
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alternate conclusion that the flu shot will not give them the flu. Finally, the belief-bias effect 
is also a systematic error that occurs in the domain of causal reasoning. The belief-bias effect 
can be defined as the discounting of new information that contradicts one's pre-existing 
beliefs and the search for new evidence that confirms one's pre-existing beliefs (Feeney, 
2007; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000, 2003). For example, if people believe the flu shot will 
give them the flu, they will likely recall instances when the flu co-occurred with receiving the 
flu shot and discount instances when the flu did not co-occur with receiving the flu shot. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the belief-bias effect in causal reasoning. 
This examination is important because pre-existing beliefs are often incorrect, as in the 
example above (i.e., receiving the flu shot will lead to getting the flu virus), thereby reducing 
one's ability to reason objectively with new information. Before any further discussion of the 
belief-bias effect, the following sections will introduce factors that are known to influence 
causal reasoning, and will outline several influential models of causal reasoning. 
Factors that Influence Causal Reasoning 
The first factor known to influence causal reasoning is called covariation. Covariation 
involves developing knowledge, through observation, about the pattern of relationships 
between potential causes and a particular effect. In other words, covariation is defined as how 
often two events regularly co-occur in time (Cheng, 1997; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2002). 
Generally speaking, the more often a cause and effect co-occur, the more likely that potential 
cause will be perceived as the cause to the effect (Cheng, 1997; Kelley, 1973; Wasserman, 
1990). For example, when one is exposed to peanuts and an allergic reaction occurs 90% of 
the time, the peanuts will more likely be inferred as the cause of the allergic reaction than if 
the reaction occurred for only 10% of the exposed interactions. This influential factor is 
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purely empirical, such that it relies solely on observation. Thus, by simply observing causal 
events, people are able to evaluate the strength of causal relationships in order to make causal 
inferences. 
A study conducted by Wasserman (1990) exemplifies the influence of covariation as 
a factor in causal reasoning. In this study participants were presented with data regarding 
meals eaten by a fictional patient and the occurrence of an allergic reaction after each meal. 
Participants were asked to determine a likely cause for the allergic reaction. The data 
presented to the participants was covariation based, such that the potential causes were either 
regularly or not regularly associated with the reaction. For example, some of the meals 
included either shrimp or strawberries, and an allergic reaction occurred for a given number 
of encounters with the shrimp or strawberries only. Wasserman found that when the 
covariation statistics for each potential cause presented was closer to 100%, the participants 
rated causation as more likely than when the covariation statistics were closer to 0%. Also, 
the results indicated intermediary effects as well, such that when the covariation statistics 
represented a 75% association, the cause was rated as more likely the source of the reaction 
than for a 25% association. This trend was the case regardless of the type of food eaten (i.e., 
it made no difference if the food was shrimp or strawberries). Therefore, the greater the co-
occurrence between the putative cause and the effect, the more likely that cause was seen as 
eliciting the effect. 
A second factor known to influence causal reasoning is referred to as pre-existing 
beliefs. As people interact with the world, they become knowledgeable about cause-and-
effect relationships and incorporate this information into their belief systems. These pre-
existing beliefs are then used to aid the reasoner in evaluating subsequent (often novel) 
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cause-and-effect relationships. Causal reasoning is then a matter of applying a causal belief 
to a new cause-and-effect problem (White, 1989). For example, through experience people 
know that if a hot element on a stove is touched it will burn one's hand. This information is 
then available for future interactions with stoves (or other similar things such as a camping 
stove) to prevent people from burning themselves. It is important to emphasize that people do 
not always consciously comprehend the power their pre-existing beliefs have on their 
everyday decision making. 
Pre-existing beliefs include a variety of causal information, such as covariation, 
temporal order, and mechanism-information. Covariation was discussed above. Covariation 
information may be used independently, or incorporated into the belief repertoire. Temporal 
order refers to when a potential cause co-occurs close in time to an effect (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1986). For example, one is much more likely to infer that peanuts are the cause of 
an allergic reaction if they are eaten just prior to the reaction rather than if they are eaten days 
before the reaction. In addition, the cause must always precede the effect. (Hagmayer & 
Waldman, 2002; Sloman, 1996). Temporal order incorporates people's most basic 
understanding of causal events in the environment and can often be incorporated in one's 
belief system after only one instance, an important conceptual difference from the learning of 
covariation information, which requires a minimum of two instances. Finally, mechanism-
information refers to the powers a cause possesses that can produce an effect. All objects 
have an inherent causal mechanism that people incorporate into their belief systems (White, 
1989). For example, a hammer has an inherent causal mechanism to break fragile objects, 
whereas a feather does not have an inherent causal mechanism to break fragile objects. 
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The theoretical incorporation of pre-existing beliefs as an influential factor in causal 
reasoning is fairly recent. For example, White (1995) provided participants with cause-and-
effect scenarios varying along dimensions of belief (i.e., high/low), and all of the scenarios 
included perfect covariate information for the proposed cause and effect. The results 
indicated that putative causes were chosen because the cause was believed to have the power 
to produce the effect, not because of its empirical association with the effect (i.e., 
covariation). Because higher causal ratings were observed in the high-belief condition than in 
the low-belief condition, this provided strong evidence that it was the pre-existing beliefs 
regarding the cause that determined the ratings rather than the covariate information. If the 
covariate information was actually causing the ratings, it would be expected that the two 
conditions would yield similar causal ratings because the two conditions were presented as 
perfect covariates. 
Without pre-existing beliefs, determining cause-and-effect relationships would be a 
difficult and time consuming task, because a large number of hypothetical causes would have 
to be evaluated each and every time an individual needed to make a causal decision (White, 
1989). That is, previous experience would not be available to guide behaviour. By recruiting 
pre-existing beliefs to aid in decision making, the number of hypothetical causes is narrowed 
to just a few plausible candidates (and in some cases just one candidate), allowing people to 
make cause-and-effect judgments in real time (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2002; White, 1989; 
1995). 
Covariation and pre-existing beliefs not only have independent effects on causal 
reasoning, the two factors have also been found to work together in facilitating cause-and-
effect decisions. Depending on the nature of the causal reasoning problem, the two factors 
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have differing effects on causal decision making processes (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003). 
In situations where the causal problem is believable rather than unbelievable (e.g., the oyster 
caused the illness), covariation information is given more weight when coming to a causal 
conclusion. This finding indicates that people search for evidence to confirm their initial 
beliefs, thereby making their pre-existing beliefs stronger. In situations where the causal 
problem is unbelievable (e.g., ulcers are caused by feeling relaxed), covariation information 
is given less weight when coming to a causal conclusion. This finding indicates that people 
rely more on their pre-existing beliefs than covariation information when the causal problem 
is unbelievable. The observation that these two factors interact lead to the development of the 
two-stage model of causal reasoning (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003). This model will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
Models of Causal Reasoning 
Several models have been proposed to explain causal reasoning processes and the 
factors that influence them. The traditional manner of explaining causal reasoning is through 
covariation-based models, such as Kelly's 1973 ANOVA model and Cheng and Novick's 
(1990, 1992) probabilistic contract model. These models assume that people have an inherent 
ability to automatically process statistical relationships in the environment. A further 
assumption of these models is that people will judge two events that co-occur frequently as 
more likely to be causally related than two events that do not co-occur frequently. In other 
words, cause-and-effect judgments are made based on the perceived degree of covariation 
between a putative cause and the observed effect (Kelly, 1973; Cheng 1997; Cheng & 
Novick, 1990, 1992; Wasserman, 1990). For example, according to the probabilistic contrast 
model, in order to determine causality, people are able to unconsciously consider the 
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probability of the effect occurring in the presence of the cause [P(e/c)] and the probability of 
the effect occurring in the absence of the cause [P(e/~c)]. Based on these probabilities, 
people are able to determine the strength of the cause's ability to produce the effect. This 
probability is represented by the formula: AP = [P(e/c)] - [P(e/~c)], where a positive AP 
indicates a strong causal relationship and a negative AP indicates no causal relationship. In 
other words, if the effect occurs more regularly in the presence of the cause than in the 
absence of the cause, then causality between the potential cause and the effect is more likely 
to be inferred, whereas if the effect does not occur more regularly in the presence of the 
cause than in the absence of the cause, then causality between the potential cause and the 
effect is less likely to be inferred (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992). 
Covariation-based models sufficiently describe the empirical process by which people 
infer cause-and-effect relationships through observation, thereby explaining the influence of 
covariation as a factor that influences causal reasoning. As well, the AP index has been 
considered a normative index of causality for decades (e.g., Kao & Wasserman, 1993). 
However, there are some fundamental problems with these models. One problem is the 
importance these models place on covariation as being the primary cue indicating causation. 
This assumption is problematic because covariation does not always imply causation (Baron, 
1988; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2002; White, 1989). Two events 
may co-occur in time but one may not have caused the other (e.g., because the moon rises 
when the sun sets does not mean that the sun setting caused the moon to rise). Another 
problem with covariation models is that the AP index requires several pieces of information 
to calculate the probabilistic causal strength between the two events. This problem means 
that these models rely on more than one observation of the cause and effect relationship to 
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determine if they co-occur in a pattern of regular association. People, however, will often 
infer cause and effect after only one observation. For example, only one observation would 
be necessary to infer that peanuts were the cause of an allergic reaction (Baron, 1988; 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2002, 2003). Another problem is that 
these models do not allow for the complexity of everyday causal relationships to be 
represented adequately. First, AP only calculates the probability of a single cause for a given 
effect. Often effects have more than one possible cause, and AP as a normative index 
becomes problematic when choosing between multiple causes. The AP index only allows the 
calculation of one probable cause at a time. Multiple indexes would have to be calculated for 
each probable cause, thereby increasing processing time (Allen & Jenkins, 1980; Spellman, 
1996). Further, covariation-based models do not include a mechanism that allows for 
people's pre-existing beliefs to influence which causal candidates are selected as causing an 
effect, because they rely exclusively on observation as the mechanism of causal inference. As 
a consequence, these models are unable to explain how people can infer causation after only 
one observation of the cause-and-effect relationship. By not incorporating pre-existing 
beliefs, covariation-based models are unable to use several critical pieces of information, 
such as mechanism-information, that make causal reasoning processing fast and efficient. For 
example, over time people become knowledgeable about an object's power to produce an 
effect, such as a hammer's ability to break fragile objects. This knowledge is then 
transferable to causal instances where observations have not yet occurred (e.g., perhaps the 
hammer has the power to break less fragile objects), something that covariation-based 
models do not allow for. These considerations strongly suggest that although people take into 
account covariation information, other factors are crucial when evaluating cause-and-effect 
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relationships, and thus models of causal reasoning need mechanisms that explicitly account 
for these additional factors. 
Furthermore, there is research suggesting that the AP index may not be as normative 
as previously thought, contradicting the assumption that repeated observations are necessary 
to come to a causal conclusion (Allan & Jenkins, 1980; Spellman, 1996; White, 2002). The 
AP index requires multiple pieces of information to calculate the causal probability using 
both confirmatory [P(e/c)] and disconfirmatory [P(e/~c)] evidence to come to a conclusion. 
However, research indicates that people do not always use both confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory evidence to come to a conclusion, which also supports the contention that 
people can make causal judgments after only one observation (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; 
Shustack & Sternberg, 1981; White, 2002). For example, White (2002) has found that when 
people are exposed to varying amounts of covariation information for a given problem, they 
tended to focus on confirmatory information only. The confirmatory information is only one 
piece of the AP index, but people were still able to come to successful causal conclusions. In 
addition, participants were found to make strong causal conclusions after only one instance 
of the example event if that event was positive. If the putative confirmatory cause was linked 
to the given effect on the first observation, people were apt to provide their causal 
conclusions immediately. Furthermore, research conducted by Allan and Jenkins (1980) 
found that when complete covariation information was presented, there was no correlation 
between the use of the covariation information and participants' actual causal judgments. The 
results from these two studies indicate that AP may not be a normative or necessary index for 
causal relations, but merely one of many different factors used to assess causation. 
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Finally, there is also research indicating that pre-existing beliefs are an important 
factor influencing causal reasoning. In a study conducted by Ahn, Kalish, Medin, and 
Gelman (1995), participants were given causal problems and asked to indicate what kind of 
information they would need to make a causal judgment. Given several alternatives, such as 
covariation information and mechanism-information, participants tended to rely on the 
mechanism-information to make their judgments. These results indicate that people prefer 
information consistent with their beliefs or knowledge about causal information rather than 
information about covariation. The results from this study indicate that covariation-based 
models fail to incorporate an influential factor, namely pre-existing beliefs, in causal 
reasoning processing (see also Shultz, 1982). 
More recently, concept-based models of causal reasoning have been developed to 
address the above concerns regarding covariation-based models. Importantly, although these 
models incorporate mechanisms for factors such as pre-existing beliefs, they do not discount 
the influence of covariation. An influential concept-based model of causal reasoning is 
White's (1989) causal powers model. The causal powers model gives priority to the role of 
pre-existing beliefs in causal reasoning above all other cues to causation. People become 
knowledgeable about the causal powers of things over their lifetime and automatically 
incorporate this knowledge into their daily causal judgments. Through interactions with the 
world, people develop a repertoire of causal beliefs and this information is then available for 
future causal judgments. 
The causal powers model proposes that the incorporation of pre-existing beliefs about 
causal relationships assists in the fast and (computationally) efficient selection of potential 
causes for a given effect, thus making the determination of a cause concise and non-arbitrary. 
Without the aid of pre-existing beliefs, people would likely be forced to evaluate numerous 
hypotheses pertaining to the causal relationship before being able to come to a decision 
(White, 1989, 1995). The recruitment of pre-existing beliefs for current causal judgments 
occurs quickly, automatically, and outside conscious awareness, therefore reducing the time 
and effort necessary for this type of mental processing (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2002). 
White (1989) suggested that causal candidates are then determined by seeking objects that 
are believed to possess the power to produce the effect. For example, if a rock, a feather, and 
a pencil were placed next to a broken dish, which one would most likely be chosen as the 
cause of the break? By recruiting the appropriate mechanism-information for each potential 
cause, the candidates can be narrowed down quickly. Without this pre-existing knowledge, 
each potential cause would have to be evaluated independently. 
Evidence supporting the causal powers model has been reported by White (1995). In 
a series of experiments, participants were given several causal scenarios and asked to judge 
between possible interpretations. White observed that when given perfect covariates (i.e., the 
cause and effect co-occurred 100% of the time), participants did not always select the 
covariation information as important in making their causal judgments. Given the covariation 
information in the scenarios, covariation-based models would predict that the covariate 
would be identified as the cause 100% of the time. However, White found that causes were 
chosen based on the content of the scenario. For example, participants were given a scenario 
asking them to choose between alternatives of a fear reaction to some dogs but not others 
(i.e., dogs with a black coat or dogs who are muzzled). Participants were given different 
alternative causes to choose from as well as complete covariation information for one of the 
alternatives. Two conditions were present, a high-belief covariation condition and a low-
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belief covariation condition. The high-belief condition had a believable alternative as the 
cause of the fear reaction paired with 100% covariation. The low-belief condition had an 
unbelievable alternative cause paired with 100% covariation. Often, participants ignored the 
covariation information and chose the causal alternative that fit best with their pre-existing 
beliefs about dogs, regardless of which alternative was paired with the covariation 
information. The results of this study suggest that covariation information alone is not a 
sufficient or necessary cue to infer causation, as predicted by covariation-based models. In 
many cases, people override the use of covariation information in favour of mechanism-
information (e.g., a muzzled dog is more likely identified as more dangerous than one with a 
black coat) when making cause-and-effect judgments. 
Schustack and Sternberg (1981) provide additional evidence that the use of pre-
existing beliefs is an important factor influencing causal reasoning. In a series of 
experiments, they investigated the importance of different sources of evidence people use to 
make causal judgments. Participants were given a series of scenarios and asked to judge the 
strength of the causal relationship on the basis of the evidence given. Using multiple 
regression analyses, Schustack and Sternberg reported that the most influential pieces of 
evidence used to make a causal inference included confirmatory information (e.g., the 
potential cause occurred with the given effect), and believable information (i.e., the given 
cause was a believable causal candidate to produce the effect). The least important sources of 
information were disconfirmations of the causal relationship (e.g., the cause was present but 
not the effect), and the quality of causal alternatives to the given effect (e.g., one cause may 
be a stronger cause of the effect than another given cause). This research indicates that pre-
existing beliefs are an important source of causal information, given that this type of 
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information accounted for the majority of the variance over and above covariation 
information. Similar results indicating people's preference for pre-existing beliefs or 
mechanism-information as a source of causal information have been provided by Ahn, et al. 
(1995) and Shultz (1982). 
To date, the evidence suggests that both covariation information and pre-existing 
beliefs are important factors that influence causal reasoning. However, the research cited 
above has focused on either one factor only, or compared the two factors against each other. 
Recently, Fugelsang and Thompson (2000, 2003) have suggested that people actually 
combine the evaluation of new covariation information with their pre-existing beliefs about 
cause-and-effect relationships. This combination of factors means that people evaluate new 
covariation information in conjunction with their pre-existing beliefs. Fugelsang and 
Thompson's (2003) two-stage model proposes that causal reasoning consists of two 
processing stages. The first stage involves the unconscious recruitment of pre-existing beliefs 
about the cause-and-effect relationship in question. These beliefs can consist of mechanism-
information, covariation information, or both. The recruitment of information at this stage is 
accomplished outside of conscious awareness and therefore people are unaware of how their 
pre-existing beliefs influence their causal reasoning. This first stage can thus be seen as a 
heuristic device that quickly and (computationally) efficiently generates plausible causal 
candidates for a particular effect, while at the same time eliminating implausible causal 
candidates. The second stage of processing involves the evaluation of new evidence (i.e., 
new covariation information). Stage two processing is effortful and occurs consciously, 
utilizing attentional and working memory resources, allowing the reasoner to draw a causal 
conclusion. Finally, the model proposes that the information activated at stage one will 
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influence the processing at stage two. For example, the type of information that is 
automatically recruited at stage one (e.g., mechanism-information or beliefs about 
covariation) affects how new information is evaluated during stage two processing. 
Recall the scenario at the beginning of this thesis as an example of how the two-stage 
model may work. Regarding the issue of what caused the illness, stage one processing 
automatically recruits information from a repertoire of pre-existing beliefs, such as the 
likelihood that oysters, spoiled mayonnaise, or consuming alcohol can make you sick, as well 
as previous experiences with such foods and drinks. These causal alternatives all entail 
mechanism-information for which the illness was caused. Second, stage two processing then 
evaluates new evidence related to the illness, such as did anyone else become ill, and if so, 
what did they eat? The new evidential information is covariate in nature (e.g., cause and 
effect both present, or cause present in the absence of the effect). Because the oyster, as the 
proposed cause of the illness, is highly believable in stage one processing, this is likely the 
response that stage two processing will work with. In stage two, because the putative cause is 
a believable candidate, the individual will likely search for covariation evidence that 
confirms the candidate belief (e.g., did anyone else become ill after eating oysters?). This is 
just one alternative conclusion, but it provides an example of how stage one processing can 
affect what happens during stage two processing. 
The two-stage model (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003) offers an elegant account of 
how covariation information and pre-existing beliefs may jointly influence causal reasoning. 
The incorporation of pre-existing beliefs into the model is important because it explains how 
people can infer causation in real time and with seeming ease, something covariation-based 
models have difficulty adequately addressing. Regarding the example above, several causes 
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to the sudden illness come quickly to mind. Without pre-existing beliefs about the cause of 
the illness, the task of generating causes would be extremely difficult and time consuming, 
because unnecessary and arbitrary causes would likely be generated. The two-stage model 
also provides an explanation for the influence of covariation as a variable, something 
conceptual models fail to adequately address. The two-stage model incorporates the influence 
of covariation information in two ways. First, the model, during stage one, processes 
covariation information from previous observations. Second, the model, during stage two, 
may process new covariation information relevant to the causal judgment. 
Fugelsang and Thompson (2003) provided compelling empirical evidence for the 
two-stage model's account of causal reasoning that is consistent with what is outlined in the 
paragraph above. In their study, participants were provided with causal judgments that 
included both pre-existing belief information and covariation information that was 
manipulated orthogonally. Some scenarios began by making the putative cause a believable 
causal candidate of the effect, whereas in other scenarios the putative cause was an 
unbelievable candidate, thereby manipulating people's pre-existing beliefs about causal 
relationships. In addition, the scenarios provided participants with new covariation 
information that either supported or contradicted the belief statement. For example, one of 
the scenarios included the statement, "You have a hypothesis that flowers blooming may be 
due to being planted in red pots" (p. 814). Following this statement, participants were given 
hypothetical survey data that either supported or contradicted the statement. Fugelsang and 
Thompson (2003) reported a significant interaction between pre-existing belief and 
covariation information, indicating that the belief-bias effect was present. That is, if the belief 
statement was believable, the effect of the covariation information was larger than if the 
17 
belief statement was unbelievable. This result supports the model's assumption that stage one 
processing affects stage two processing. These results suggest that the two-stage model may 
be better at explaining how multiple forms of information interact during causal reasoning 
than either covariation-based models or conceptual-based models. One the one hand, 
covariation-based models do not include a mechanism for the influence of pre-existing 
beliefs, whereas, on the other hand, concept-based models do not include a mechanism for 
the influence of new covariation information. In conclusion, because covariation-based and 
concept-based models cannot account for an interaction between pre-existing beliefs and new 
covariation information; these models would not be able to account for the belief-bias effect 
in causal reasoning. Because the two-stage model is the only model that can adequately 
address the interaction of pre-existing beliefs and covariation information it provides the 
theoretical basis for the research presented in this thesis. 
Causal Reasoning and the Belief-Bias Effect 
The belief-bias effect occurs when people make errors in causal judgments directly 
related to the automatic recruitment and utilization of their pre-existing beliefs. As noted, the 
belief-bias effect occurs when new information that contradicts one's pre-existing beliefs is 
discounted and when new evidence is sought to confirm one's pre-existing beliefs (Feeney, 
2007; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000, 2003). People utilize their pre-existing beliefs as a 
source of knowledge and incorporate this information into their everyday lives. However, 
pre-existing beliefs are often incorrect, leading to the use of false information to make 
decisions. People reason with pre-existing beliefs and the problem with incorrect beliefs is 
that they lead to incorrect causal inferences (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Klauer, Munsch, 
& Naumer, 2000). For example, if an individual believes that the flu shot will give them the 
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flu, then they will discount evidence that suggests it will not and be more likely to recall 
previous instances of someone they know getting the flu after receiving the flu shot. This 
effect is important to consider because of the great influence pre-existing beliefs have on 
reasoning processes. Because pre-existing beliefs are utilized automatically, people are not 
aware of how much their knowledge or pre-existing beliefs influence their decision making 
(e.g. Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; White, 1995). 
The belief-bias effect has been a well documented effect in the reasoning literature 
for decades (Evans, 2008). However, the theoretical inclusion of beliefs in causal reasoning 
is relatively recent (e.g., Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003; White, 1995), because traditionally 
the incorporation of beliefs in reasoning processing was deemed irrational (Evans, Brooks, & 
Pollard, 1985). Despite this view, research has shown that the incorporation of pre-existing 
beliefs in causal reasoning is indeed rational (see Evans, 2002). Without incorporating 
knowledge of the world in decision making processes, people may evaluate numerous 
potential hypotheses pertaining to the causal relationship before coming to a conclusion 
(Fugelsang & Thompson, 2002; White, 1989). The incorporation of past knowledge allows 
people to constrain the number of possible hypotheses under evaluation and thus make 
decisions in real time. 
The influence of pre-existing beliefs becomes problematic under conditions in which 
pre-existing beliefs are incorrect representations of reality (e.g., the flu shot causes the flu). 
Fugelsang and Thompson's (2003) two-stage model provides a plausible account of how this 
could occur. According to the two-stage model, pre-existing beliefs are automatically 
recruited during stage one processing, and these beliefs then influence stage two processing. 
Because people are biased to place heavy emphasis on their pre-existing beliefs, any such 
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beliefs that are incorrect may lead an individual to disregard new, relevant information, and 
to seek out information consistent with the incorrect beliefs. Thus, for example, if an 
individual does not believe that a potential cause has the ability to produce a particular effect, 
then the evaluation of new relevant information will be ignored. Alternatively, if an 
individual believes that the potential cause has the ability to produce the effect, they will 
search for evidence that supports, or is consistent with, this belief (Fugelsang & Thompson, 
2000; Klauer et al„ 2000). 
It should be noted that the two-stage model predicts that invalid causal reasoning will 
occur only under conditions in which the beliefs recruited during stage one processing are 
false. If the beliefs recruited during stage one processing are true, then the two-stage model 
predicts that valid causal reasoning will occur. This inclusion of beliefs is the model's 
explanation of why people may correctly infer cause-and-effect relationships, and that under 
many conditions (i.e., when people hold correct knowledge of the world), the incorporation 
of pre-existing beliefs is indeed adaptive or beneficial. The belief-bias effect exemplifies how 
important pre-existing beliefs are to causal reasoning processes, therefore making it 
important to systematically study the belief-bias effect. 
White (1989) and Fugelsang and Thompson (2003) have demonstrated that pre-
existing beliefs influence causal reasoning processes, and that their inclusion allows people 
to make decisions quickly and (computationally) efficiently. However, the belief-bias effect, 
under conditions in which false beliefs are used to make decisions on the relevance of new 
information or in which information that is consistent with the false belief is sought after, 
exemplifies how the inclusion of pre-existing beliefs can become problematic. An important 
question examined in this thesis, therefore, is whether the magnitude of the belief-bias effect 
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can be altered through the manipulation of the content of cause-and-effect problems. In other 
areas of reasoning, it has been shown that the content of a problem can influence reasoning 
processes. For example, Evans (2006) found that accuracy in syllogistic reasoning differed 
between problems with abstract content as compared to problems with concrete content. 
Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the magnitude of the belief-bias effect 
can be altered by manipulating the content of cause-and-effect problems. 
A recent study by Burnett, Fugelsang, Owen, and Siakaluk (2007) found initial 
support for the idea that the content of cause-and-effect problems can influence the belief-
bias effect. This study used the same belief-bias paradigm as developed by Fugelsang and 
Thompson (2003), whereby participants were given a series of scenarios beginning with a 
belief statement that was either believable or unbelievable, followed by supporting or 
contradicting covariation information. Half of the scenarios contained specific content (e.g., 
specific health problems such as diabetes) in the belief statement and the remaining scenarios 
contained general content (e.g., general or overall health problems) in the belief statement. 
Participants were then asked to rate the likelihood that the putative cause produced the effect 
based on all of the information presented in the scenario. The following examples are of a 
specific, unbelievable scenario with contradicting survey data, and then of a general, 
believable scenario with supporting data: 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of diabetes in 
males. You have a hypothesis that males' diabetes is caused by 
male pattern baldness. To test this theory you survey 10 men 
who have diabetes and 10 men who do not have diabetes. You 
find that 1 of the 10 men who have diabetes also has male 
pattern baldness; 9 of the 10 men who do not have diabetes do 
not have male pattern baldness. Given the above information, 
how likely do you think it is that males' diabetes is caused by 
male pattern baldness? 
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Imagine that you are trying to determine the cause of improved 
health. You have a hypothesis that cutting back on the amount 
of cigarettes smoked per day will improve health. To test this 
theory you survey 10 smokers who have recently cut back from 
smoking one pack of cigarettes per day to half a pack of 
cigarettes per day, and 10 smokers who continue to smoke one 
pack of cigarettes per day. You find that 9 of the 10 smokers 
who cut back on the amount of cigarettes smoked per day have 
improved health, and 1 of the 10 smokers who continued to 
smoke one pack per day have improved health. Given the 
above information, how likely do you think it is that cutting 
back on the amount of cigarettes smoked per day will improve 
health? 
There were two important findings in this study. First, a significant belief-bias effect 
was present. This effect means that the covariation data was weighed more heavily for the 
believable than for the unbelievable statements. Second, new evidence was more likely to be 
evaluated objectively when the content of the scenario was specific than when it was general. 
This result suggests that there was a reduction of the belief-bias effect for scenarios 
containing specific content. It was proposed that by making the content of the problem more 
specific the number of available possible causes of the effect was reduced. In terms of the 
two-stage model, Burnett et al. (2007) proposed that, the content of the scenarios influenced 
the automatic recruitment of pre-existing beliefs during stage one processing by restricting 
the amount of possible causes available in the specific content condition. This in turn 
affected stage two processing, the stage at which the evaluation of new evidence occurs. 
Therefore, the results of this study showed that when the information was specific (e.g., 
diabetes) rather than general (e.g., poor health), the influence of pre-existing beliefs was 
attenuated, thereby reducing the belief-bias effect. In summary, the Burnett et al. study 
demonstrated that the mechanism by which pre-existing beliefs are recruited can be 
influenced by the type of content presented in the cause-and-effect problem. 
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The purpose of this research was to replicate and extend the Burnett et al. (2007) 
findings. More specifically, this thesis will further examine whether two new variables can 
alter the magnitude of the belief-bias effect in causal reasoning through the manipulation of 
content. This manipulation will be done using the same belief-bias paradigm that was 
developed by Fugelsang and Thompson (2003) (and used by Burnett et al., 2007), whereby 
participants were given causal problem scenarios beginning with a belief-statement, which 
was either believable or unbelievable, followed by hypothetical covariation data that either 
supported or contradicted the statement. Participants then made causal ratings as to the 
relationship between the putative cause and the given effect based on all the information in 
the scenario. The content of the problem scenarios was manipulated through the following 
novel variables: health type and positivity. 
The first measure, health type, was selected as an attempt to replicate the findings of 
Burnett et al. (2007) that more specific content, as compared to general content, can lead to 
an attenuation of the belief-bias effect. The measure consisted of two content conditions: 
physical health and mental health. These two conditions were chosen because it was 
originally assumed that physical health content would be more specific than mental health 
content. That is, it was assumed that the physical health scenarios would elicit fewer 
hypothetical causes of an effect than the mental health scenarios (but see below). For 
example, fewer possible causes may be generated for ulcers (e.g., stress, alcohol) than for 
anxiety (e.g., chemical imbalance, heredity, drinking too much coffee, public speaking). 
Thus, it was originally hypothesized that the belief-bias effect should be smaller for the 
physical health scenarios than for the mental health scenarios. 
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The second measure, positivity, also consisted of two content conditions: positive and 
negative. This variable was chosen based on evidence from social psychology that there is a 
positivity bias in human cognition in that people have an implicit need to seek out positive 
information about the self and their surroundings, while placing less importance on negative 
information (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & 
Hankin, 2004). For example, Schustack and Sternberg (1981) reported that people showed a 
bias toward positive information when testing causal inferences. When investigating causal 
sources for complex and uncertain information, they found that during reasoning, people 
were more confirmatory with positive information than with negative information. Thus, 
individuals showed a bias toward positively framed evidence as a source for the problem 
under evaluation rather than negatively framed evidence. Schustack and Sternberg attributed 
this finding to a "bias against negativity" (p. 117), because it seems that people, in general, 
have a tendency to undervalue information negatively framed in both form and meaning. 
Fitting with the belief-bias effect, and individual tendencies to search for evidence that 
confirms their pre-existing beliefs, it seems reasonable to assume that people should be more 
likely to have a larger belief-bias effect for positive than negative content. It is hypothesized 
that the belief-bias effect will be reduced for causal scenarios with negative content than it 
will be for causal scenarios with positive content, because negative scenarios will elicit fewer 
hypothetical causes of the effect and therefore reduce the likelihood that the presented 
covariation evidence will be discounted. 
In summary, problem content will be manipulated in two independent ways. First, 
there will be a manipulation of health type, whereby some cause-and-effect scenarios will 
depict putative causes for physical health effects and others will depict putative causes for 
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mental health effects. Second, there will be a manipulation of positivity, whereby different 
cause-and-effect scenarios will depict putative causes for positive effects and others will 
depict putative causes for negative effects. Scenarios were selected to be believable or 
unbelievable based on believability pilot ratings. The hypothetical empirical evidence 
following the belief statements was presented in terms of covariation data consistent with the 
procedure used by Cheng (1997). That is, the empirical evidence included information about 
the probability of the effect occurring in the presence of the cause [P(e/c)] and the probability 
of the effect occurring in the absence of the cause [P(e/~c)]. These two pieces of information 
gave participants the ability to calculate AP. The presentation of the empirical evidence in 
this way allowed it to be either consistent or inconsistent with the belief statement. The 
experiment proper reported in this thesis had two content manipulations. First, there was a 
health type manipulation. This part of the experiment had a 2 (Health Type Content: mental 
health, physical health) x 2 (Believability: believable, unbelievable) x 2 (Covariation: 
consistent, inconsistent) repeated-measures design. Second, there was a positivity 
manipulation. This part of the experiment had a 2 (Positivity Content: positive, negative) x 2 
(Believability: believable, unbelievable) x 2 (Covariation: consistent, inconsistent) repeated-
measures design. 
There are several hypotheses that are of primary importance for this thesis. First, it is 
hypothesized that the belief-bias effect should be present for both content manipulations. The 
belief-bias effect is represented through a two-way interaction between believability and 
covariation. Second, it is hypothesized that the belief-bias effect should be reduced for the 
physical health and negativity conditions compared to the mental health and positivity 
conditions, respectively. This hypothesis would be consistent with the findings from Burnett 
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et al. (2007) and is predicted by the two-stage model of causal reasoning (Fugelsang & 
Thompson, 2003), because the recruitment of pre-existing beliefs in stage one processing can 
influence stage two processing. Other important hypotheses include a main effect of 
believability and a main effect of covariation, whereby scenarios with believable statements 
or supporting covariation evidence will be rated as more causally relevant than scenarios 
with unbelievable statements or contradicting covariation evidence. These hypothesized main 
effects are consistent with the findings from both Fugelsang and Thompson and Burnett et 
al., and serve as important manipulation checks to ensure that these variables were 
influencing responding. 
Pilot Study 1: Collection of Stimulus Norms for the Health Type Measure 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduate students from the University of Northern British Columbia 
(UNBC) participated in the pilot study. All participants gave informed consent and received 
bonus course credit for their participation. These participants did not participate in any of the 
other pilot studies or the Experiment. 
Materials 
Participants completed a questionnaire consisting of 22 cause-and-effect statements. 
The statements were divided into two categories: physical health topics (e.g., ulcers), and 
mental health topics (e.g., anxiety). The statements were generated from common physical 
and mental health myths that were found through an Internet search of relevant health 
websites.1 Common health myths were used because they should elicit strong beliefs and 
include general health topics for which most people should have some knowledge. 
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For the believability condition, the physical and mental health statements were 
randomly assigned to believable or unbelievable categories. Half of the statements were 
framed as believable (e.g., lung cancer is caused by smoking) and the other half of the 
statements were framed as unbelievable (e.g., ulcers are caused by feeling relaxed). The final 
set of statements selected for the health type content manipulation of the Experiment 
consisted of four conditions: physical believable, physical unbelievable, mental believable 
and mental unbelievable. 
Each statement used the following structure: "Imagine you are trying to determine the 
cause of (effect). You have a hypothesis that (effect) may be due to (causal candidate)." This 
structure is consistent with other studies in causal reasoning (Fugelsang, Thompson, & 
Dunbar, 2006; Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003). Participants were then asked to rate how 
believable each statement was on a 7-point Likert scale, with a rating of 1 indicating that the 
statement was highly unbelievable and a rating of 7 indicating that the statement was highly 
believable. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of 2-3 people. Each group was given the following 
instructions: 
You will be asked to rate the degree to which you think the two 
variables are causally linked (i.e., the degree to which you 
believe that the first variable has the potential to cause the 
second to occur). To do this, you will be asked to assign to each 
scenario a value from the scale provided, where 1 means that 
the given cause is not a believable cause of the given effect, and 
7 means that the given cause is a highly believable cause of the 
given effect. The more believable the causal relationship, the 
higher the value you should assign to that scenario. Please do 
not go back and change your answers. 
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The participants worked independently and at their own pace. The questionnaire took, 
on average, 20 minutes to complete. A complete list of the items is included in Appendix 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Two statements from each condition were chosen to be used in the Experiment. 
Statements were chosen based on high means and low standard deviations for the believable 
categories, and low means and low standard deviations for the unbelievable categories. The 
means and standard deviations of the selected statements for each condition are shown in 
Table 1. The difference between the physical believable and physical unbelievable conditions 
and the difference between the mental believable and mental unbelievable conditions (3.05 
and 2.98, respectively) was not significant, t < 1. Thus, the two physical conditions and the 
two mental conditions were matched in terms of believability. For each condition, the 
statements chosen for the Experiment are indicated with an asterisk in Appendix 1. 
Pilot Study 2: Collection of Stimulus Norms for the Positivity Measure 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduate students from UNBC participated in the pilot study. All 
participants gave informed consent and received bonus course credit for their completion of 
the questionnaire. These participants did not participate in any of the other pilot studies or the 
Experiment. 
Materials and Procedure 
Positivity Ratings. Participants were presented with a questionnaire that consisted of 
27 topics. The topics presented were the effects from the above cause-and-effect statements. 
The topics chosen included every day cause-and-effect relationships (e.g., pollution causes 
global warming) that included concepts that were either negative (e.g., global warming) or 
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positive (e.g., environmental health). The participants were asked to rate each concept's 
positivity on a 7-point Likert scale, with a rating of 1 indicating 'negative' and a rating of 7 
indicating 'positive'. The positivity questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2. 
Believability Ratings. The same group of participants was presented with a second 
questionnaire that listed all 27 cause-and-effect statements included in the positivity 
questionnaire. Participants were asked to rate how believable each statement was on a 7-
point Likert scale with a rating of 1 indicating that the statement was highly unbelievable and 
a rating of 7 indicating that the statement was highly believable. 
The positivity variable was crossed with the believability variable such that the 
negative and positive statements were randomly assigned to be framed as either believable or 
unbelievable. Thus, a total of four categories were created: positive believable, positive 
unbelievable, negative believable, and negative unbelievable. An example of a positive 
believable statement included 'environmental health may be due to recycling,' and an 
example of a negative believable statement included 'global warming may be due to 
pollution.' A complete list of the items is presented in Appendix 3. Each statement used the 
same word structure as in Pilot Study 1. The believability questionnaire was always 
administered before the positivity questionnaire, so that the positivity ratings would not 
influence the believability ratings. The procedure and instructions were the same as in Pilot 
Study 1. However, the two questionnaires took, on average, an additional 10 minutes to 
complete. 
Results and Discussion 
Two statements from each condition were chosen in the following manner. Positive 
believable statements were chosen based on high means and low standard deviations for each 
measure. Negative believable statements were chosen based on low means and low standard 
deviations for the positivity measure and high means and low standard deviations for the 
believability measure. Positive unbelievable statements were chosen based on high means 
and low standard deviations for the positivity measure and low means and low standard 
deviations for the believability measure. Finally, negative unbelievable statements were 
chosen based on low means and low standard deviations for each measure. The means and 
standard deviations for each of the four conditions are shown in Table 2. 
The positive and negative statements were matched such that there was no difference 
in positivity ratings between conditions. The negativity ratings for the believable and 
unbelievable conditions had means of 1.93 and 2.02, respectively, which were not 
significantly different t (29) =1.10, SEM = .076, p = .28. The positivity ratings for both the 
believable and unbelievable conditions had means of 6.18 and 6.10, respectively, which were 
not significantly different, t < 1. The statements were also matched so that there was no 
difference in the believability ratings between conditions. The believability ratings for the 
positive and negative believable conditions were 5.97 and 6.03, respectively, which were not 
significantly different, t < 1. Finally, the believability ratings for the positive and negative 
unbelievable conditions were 1.83 and 1.88, respectively, which were not significantly 
different, t < 1. The statements chosen for positivity content manipulation of the Experiment 
are indicated with an asterisk in Appendix 3. 
Pilot Study 3: Generation of Causal Hypotheses for the Health Type and Positivity Measures 
The purpose of the third pilot study was to directly examine the hypothesis that the 
content manipulations outlined above can restrict the number of hypothetical causes recruited 
during stage one of causal reasoning processing. More specifically, this pilot study examined 
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whether people were sensitive to the different types of content manipulated by the health type 
and positivity measures. It was hypothesized that physical health content would yield fewer 
hypothetical causes to a given effect compared to the mental health content. It was assumed 
that this outcome would occur due to the fact that physical health ailments are generally more 
concrete than mental health ailments. In other words, mental health ailments may have a 
wider variety of possible causes than physical health ailments. For example, anxiety many be 
caused by public speaking, drinking too much coffee, a chemical imbalance, depression, et 
cetera; whereas, an ulcer may be caused by stress, or a bacteria in the lining of the stomach. 
In addition, it was hypothesized that negative content would yield fewer hypothetical causes 
to a given effect compared to the positive content. This hypothesis was based on results from 
social psychological research suggesting that people have a bias toward positive content. For 
example, Heine et al. (1999) have demonstrated that people have a general tendency to be 
more likely to respond to positive content than negative content. In other words, people may 
be able to generate more possible causal alternatives to positive content than negative content 
due to their bias against negativity. To test these hypotheses, participants were asked to 
generate multiple alternative causal hypotheses for each statement chosen from the results of 
Pilot Studies 1 and 2. 
Participants 
Thirty-two undergraduate students from UNBC participated in the pilot study. All 
participants gave informed consent and received bonus course credit for their participation. 
These participants did not participate in any of the other pilot studies or the Experiment. 
Materials and Procedure 
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Participants were presented with the list of 16 cause-and-effect statements. For each 
statement participants were asked to list as many alternative causes as they could for the 
effect listed in each statement. For example, if given the following statement "Imagine you 
are trying to determine the cause of anxiety. You have a hypothesis that anxiety may be due 
to public speaking.", participants used the effect of 'anxiety' to try and list as many 
alternative causes to the example cause provided in the statement. Participants were given 
two minutes to complete each statement and the statements were counterbalanced for 
presentation order. An example questionnaire is presented in Appendix 4. 
Participants were given the questionnaire in booklet format. Each participant was also 
given a complete example at the beginning of the questionnaire, and was permitted to ask 
questions before they began. Participants were given the following instructions: 
For each of the following statements, try to come up with as 
many alternative causes for the effect as you can. You will 
have two minutes for each statement to try to write down as 
many as you can. The researcher will let you know when to go 
on to the next statement. 
Participants were instructed to let the researcher know when they were ready to begin and the 
researcher timed the two minute intervals for each statement. Participants were tested on an 
individual basis. The complete questionnaire took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
Results and Discussion 
For each statement, the total number of causes generated was calculated. Means and 
standard deviations were calculated for each condition (i.e., physical health vs. mental health, 
and positive vs. negative), and were collapsed across the believability condition. The mean 
number of causes generated for the physical health and mental health conditions were 4.64 
(SD = 1.42) and 4.09 (SD = 1.64), respectively. A paired samples Mest indicated that 
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significantly more causes for the physical health condition were generated than for the 
mental health condition, f(31) = 2.74, SEM = .20, p < .05. The mean number of causes 
generated for the positive and negative conditions were 4.67 (SD - 1.57) and 3.83 (SD = 
1.35), respectively. A paired samples t-test indicated that significantly more causes for the 
positive condition were generated than for the negative condition, f(31) = 5.03, SEM = .17, p 
< .001. 
The original hypothesis that participants would generate fewer causal hypotheses for 
the physical health condition than for the mental health condition was not supported. In 
actuality, participants generated significantly more causal hypotheses for the physical health 
condition than for the mental health condition. Even though the original hypothesis was not 
supported, the results still suggest that participants were sensitive to this manipulation of 
content. Because the results suggest that the restriction of pre-existing beliefs in stage one 
processing is occurring in the mental health condition rather than in the physical health 
condition, the hypothesis for the health type content manipulation of the Experiment was 
altered, such that the belief-bias effect should be attenuated for the mental health condition 
compared to the physical health condition. 
The results from Pilot study 3 provided support for the hypothesis that participants 
would generate fewer causal hypotheses for the negative content condition compared to the 
positive content condition, and therefore that the belief-bias effect should be attenuated for 
statements depicting negative content compared to statements depicting positive content. 
Overall, the results from this pilot study indicated that people were sensitive to different 
manipulations of content in causal reasoning, and that the recruitment of pre-existing beliefs 
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during stage one processing can be restricted in the physical health and negative content 
conditions. 
Experiment 
The purpose of this experiment was to attempt to replicate and extend the results 
reported by Burnett et al. (2007), which demonstrated that the magnitude of the belief-bias 
effect may be manipulated through the presentation of different types of content. The Burnett 
et al. results suggested that the belief-bias effect may be attenuated under conditions in which 
the content presented in the causal problem was specific. Under the conditions in which the 
content of the problem was more specific, it was suggested that fewer pre-existing beliefs 
were recruited during stage one processing of the two-stage model of causal reasoning 
(Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003). Because fewer pre-existing beliefs were recruited and 
therefore examined, a reduction in the belief-bias effect occurred. To further examine the use 
of content on the belief-bias effect and to extend the results of the Burnett et al. study, the 
current experiment applied two new content variables to the belief-bias paradigm in order to 
measure the effects of content manipulations on the magnitude of the belief-bias effect. 
Because the Burnett et al. variable, specificity, consisted of both specific and general health 
topics across the two conditions, specific and general, the first manipulation of the current 
experiment used a related but novel variable, health type. The health type variable divided 
the cause-and-effect problems into physical health and mental health conditions. Because the 
specificity variable used in the Burnett et al. study included all types of health content, the 
novel variable, health type, disentangled the problem content into physical health content and 
mental health content. As the results of Pilot Study 3 indicated, more alternative causes were 
generated for the physical health statements than for the mental health statements. Therefore, 
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the hypothesis was that the belief-bias effect should be attenuated in the mental health 
condition compared to the physical health condition. 
The second manipulation of the current experiment consisted of the variable 
positivity. The purpose of this manipulation was to extend the findings of the Burnett et al. 
(2007) study using a novel variable unrelated to specificity. The positivity variable consists of 
two content conditions: positive and negative. The positivity variable was chosen based on 
evidence from social psychology that suggests there is a positivity bias in human cognition 
(Heine et al., 1999; Shustack & Sternberg, 1981), such that people seek out positive 
information about the self and its surroundings, and place less emphasis on negative 
information (Mezulis et al., 2004). Related to decision making, people show an inclination to 
focus on positive content, ignoring negative content when making decisions (Schustack & 
Sternberg, 1981). The hypothesis for the positivity measure was that people would have a 
smaller belief-bias effect for cause-and-effect scenarios depicting negative content than for 
those scenarios depicting positive content. This should occur because fewer pre-existing 
beliefs should be recruited and examined for negative content during stage one of the two-
stage model (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003). 
Participants 
Fifty-six UNBC undergraduate students and 67 University of Waterloo (UW) 
undergraduate students participated in the experiment (for a total number of 123 
participants). Of the participants, 47 were male and 73 were female, and the mean age was 
21.48 years (SD = 5.52) All participants provided informed consent and received partial 
course credit for participating. Course credit was assigned based on the research participant 
pool guidelines of the relevant university. 
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Materials 
Belief-Bias Measure for Health Type. This measure consisted of eight scenarios in 
which participants judged the relationship between a potential cause and a potential effect. 
Each factor of the design was manipulated orthogonally among the three independent 
variables: believability, covariation, and health type. Each scenario began with a cause-and-
effect statement (half depicting physical health scenarios and the other half depicting mental 
health scenarios) that was either believable or unbelievable. Hypothetical covariation data 
was also included that either supported or contradicted the belief statement. For each 
scenario, participants were given enough covariation information to evaluate the strength of 
the causal relationship according to covariation models (Cheng, 1997). Participants were 
given two pieces of information in each scenario: the probability of the effect occurring in 
the presence of the cause [P(e/c)] and the probability of the effect occurring in the absence of 
the cause [P(e/~c)]. In this experiment, the supporting data included a 90% probability that 
the effect occurred in the presence of the cause and a 10% probability that the effect occurred 
in the absence of the cause. The probabilities were reversed (10% and 90%) in the scenarios 
where the data contradicted the statement. Participants were then required to rate how likely 
it was that the cause would produce the effect based on all of the given information. 
Belief-Bias Measure for Positivity. This measure also consisted of eight scenarios that 
were developed in an identical fashion as the belief-bias measure for health type. However, 
the measure was altered so that the causal scenarios contained content reflective of the 
positivity variable. 
Believability Ratings. Participants were also given the sixteen believability statements 
and were asked to rate each statement's believability. These statements were identical to 
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those in the belief-bias measure but without the additional covariation information. The 
results from this portion of the questionnaire were then compared to those obtained from 
Pilot Studies 1 and 2. 
Procedure 
The participants were tested in groups of 3-5 people, and informed consent was 
obtained before continuing with the questionnaire. Two booklets were generated, with the 
type of scenario (physical health/mental health or positive/negative) counterbalanced for 
presentation order. There were a total of 16 scenarios per booklet, eight from each of the 
health type and positivity measures. A version of the general questionnaire is presented in 
Appendix 5. 
The researcher went over the instructions with the participants, and the instructions 
were also provided on the front of the booklets for additional review. The instructions 
provided were similar to those presented in Pilot Studies 1 and 2; however, participants were 
also instructed to consider the covariation evidence in conjunction with the statements before 
making their ratings. After the participants completed the general experiment questionnaire, 
they were given the believability ratings questionnaire. The believability ratings 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix 6. The believability ratings questionnaire instructions 
were identical to those used in Pilot Studies 1 and 2. The believability ratings were always 
presented after the belief-bias questionnaire so that the participant's believability ratings 
would not prime their responses to the belief-bias scenarios. Once both questionnaire 
booklets were completed, participants were provided with a debriefing sheet and were told 
the purpose of the experiment. The entire experiment took approximately 40 minutes to 
complete. 
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Design 
Health Type Measure. This portion of the experiment consisted of a 2 (Believability: 
believable, unbelievable) x 2 (Covariation: support, contradict) x 2 (Health Type: physical 
health, mental health) repeated-measures design. 
Positivity Measure. This portion of the experiment consisted of a 2 (Believability: 
believable, unbelievable) x 2 (Covariation: support, contradict) x 2 (Positivity: positive 
content, negative content) repeated-measures design. 
Results 
Health Type Measure. The means and standard errors are presented in Figure 1. A 
three-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main 
effect of believability, F(l , 122) = 38.53, MSE = 2.99, p < .001, f|2 = .24, with believable 
scenarios rated as significantly more likely to occur than unbelievable scenarios. A 
significant main effect was also observed for covariation, F(l, 122) = 358.83, MSE = 4.58, p 
< .001, f\ = .75, with scenarios with supporting covariation information being rated as 
significantly more likely than scenarios with contradicting covariation information. The main 
effect of health type was not significant, F < 1, as neither the physical health nor the mental 
health conditions were rated as more likely to occur. This non-significant effect was 
expected. 
The omnibus ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between believability 
and covariation, F( 1, 122) = 47.40, MSE = 2.29, p < .001, if = .28. This interaction indicates 
that the belief bias effect was present. The belief-bias interaction indicates that the effects of 
covariation were higher for the believable than for the unbelievable condition. The overall 
belief-bias score collapsed across the health type conditions was 1.35, which indicates that 
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the believable scenarios were rated on average 1.35 points higher than the unbelievable 
scenarios. The significance of the belief-bias interaction also means that the scenarios were 
successful in inducing belief-bias in the participants in order to test the manipulation of the 
additional variable of health type. The ANOVA did not reveal a significant interaction 
between health type and believability, F < 1, health type and covariation, F(l , 122) = 2.68, 
MSE = 1.80, p = .10, r| = .02, or the three-way interaction between believability, covariation, 
and health type, F <1. Regarding this last null result, the belief-bias difference scores were 
1.31 and 1.35 for the physical health and mental health conditions, respectively. 
Positivity Measure. The means and standard errors are presented in Figure 2. A 
three-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of believability, 
F(l , 122) = 77.06, MSE = 3.18, p < .001, r\2 = .39, with believable scenarios being rated as 
significantly more likely to occur than the unbelievable scenarios. There was also a 
significant main effect of covariation, F(l , 122) = 387.81, MSE = 4.41, p < .001, r\ = .76, 
with scenarios with supporting covariation information being rated as significantly more 
likely than scenarios with contradicting covariation information. The main effect of positivity 
was not 
significant, F < 1, as neither the positive nor the negative scenarios were rated as more likely 
to occur. This non-significant effect was expected. 
The omnibus ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between believability 
and covariation, F(l , 122) = 41.71, MSE = 2.15, p < .001, f|2 = .26. This interaction indicates 
that the belief-bias effect was present. This belief-bias interaction indicates that the effects of 
covariation were higher for the believable than the unbelievable condition. The overall 
belief-bias score collapsed across positivity conditions was 1.24, which indicates that the 
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believable scenarios were rated on average 1.24 points higher than the unbelievable 
scenarios. The significance of the belief-bias effect interaction also means that the scenarios 
were successful in inducing the belief-bias in the participants in order to test the manipulation 
of the additional variable of positivity. The ANOVA revealed a significant interaction 
between positivity and believability, F( 1, 122) = 13.22, MSE = 1.32, p < .001, f|2 = .10. The 
positive scenarios, both believable and unbelievable were rated as more likely than the 
negative scenarios, both believable and unbelievable. The interaction between positivity and 
covariation was not significant, F (1, 122) = 3.04, MSE = 1.78, p = .08, if = .02. 
Importantly, the three-way interaction between believability, covariation, and 
positivity was significant, F( 1, 122) = 4.42, MSE = 1.29, p < .05, if = .04. This result 
indicates that there is a significant difference in the size of the belief-bias effect between the 
positive and negative conditions. The belief-bias effect difference score for the positive and 
negative conditions were 1.50 and .90, respectively (see Figure 2). 
Believability Ratings 
Health Type Measure. Means and standard deviations were calculated for the 
believability ratings of the eight experimental scenarios in order to provide a comparison 
between the pilot and experimental groups. Because it was shown in Pilot Study 1 that there 
was no significant difference between the believability ratings for the believable statements 
across covariation conditions and between the unbelievable statements across the covariation 
conditions, the scores were collapsed to create one mean for the believable and one mean for 
the unbelievable conditions in this analysis. The means (and standard deviations) for the 
believable condition for the pilot and experimental groups were 5.16 (.86) and 5.37 (.76), 
respectively. An independent samples ?-test revealed that these means were not significantly 
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different, 181) = 1.66, SEM- .13, p = .10. The means (and standard deviations) for the 
unbelievable condition for the pilot and experimental groups were 2.15 (.87) and 2.10 (.93), 
respectively. An independent samples Mest revealed that these means were not significantly 
different, t < 1. These results indicate that the sample of participants from both the pilot and 
experimental groups rated believability in a similar fashion. 
Believability Ratings for Positivity Measure. Means and standard deviations were 
calculated for the believability ratings of the eight experimental scenarios in order to provide 
a comparison between the pilot and experimental groups. Because it was shown in Pilot 
Study 2 that there was no significant difference between the believability ratings for the 
believable statements across covariation conditions or for the unbelievable statements across 
covariation conditions, the scores were collapsed to create one mean for the believable 
statement and unbelievable statement conditions in this case. The means (and standard 
deviations) for the believable condition for the pilot and experimental groups were 6.00 (.77) 
and 5.94 (.79), respectively. An independent samples Mest revealed that these means were 
not significantly different, t < 1. The means (and standard deviations) for the unbelievable 
condition for the pilot and experimental groups were 1.86 (.83) and 2.16 (.89), respectively. 
An independent samples Mest revealed that these means were not significantly different, 
?(151) = 1.71, SEM= .18, p = .10. These results indicate that the sample of participants from 
both the pilot and experimental groups rated believability in a similar fashion. 
General Discussion 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the influence of manipulations of content 
on the magnitude of the belief-bias effect. A recent study by Burnett et al. (2007) found 
initial support for the idea that the content of cause-and-effect problems can influence the 
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magnitude of the belief-bias effect. They found that when the content was relatively more 
specific, and hence elicited fewer pre-existing beliefs, the magnitude of the belief-bias effect 
was attenuated. The current thesis attempted to further examine whether the belief-bias effect 
can be attenuated, through the reduction of the number of pre-existing beliefs elicited, by 
using two new variables, health type and positivity, in cause-and-effect scenarios. 
Health Type 
The first new variable used in this thesis was health type, with the following 
conditions: physical health content and mental health content. The original hypothesis was 
that the physical health content statements would generate fewer pre-existing beliefs than the 
mental health content statements, which should result in an attenuated belief-bias effect for 
the physical health content condition. However, as the results of Pilot Study 3 revealed, it 
was in fact the mental health content statements that generated significantly fewer pre-
existing beliefs. As a consequence, the original hypothesis was altered, such that the belief-
bias effect should be attenuated for the mental health content condition. 
There were main effects of believability and covariation. Participants rated believable 
scenarios as more likely to occur than unbelievable scenarios, and supporting covariation 
scenarios as more likely to occur than contradicting covariation scenarios. These two results 
were necessary for the belief-bias interaction to occur, and served as important manipulation 
checks to ensure that the believability and covariation variables were influencing 
participants' responses. In addition, the significant two-way interaction between believability 
and covariation, which represents the belief-bias effect, was observed. The belief-bias effect 
interaction indicated that pre-existing beliefs did impact reasoning, such that the covariation 
evidence was taken into account more for the believable cause-and-effect scenarios than for 
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the unbelievable cause-and-effect scenarios. In other words, the belief-bias interaction 
suggests that the covariation information was used to a greater extent as support for the 
reasoner's pre-existing beliefs in the believable scenarios, and therefore supporting the idea 
that people relied on their pre-existing beliefs to aid them through causal reasoning 
processing when it made the most sense to do so. 
The hypothesis that the belief-bias effect would be attenuated for the mental health 
content condition but not for the physical health content condition was not supported: there 
was no difference in the size of the belief-bias effect across the two health type conditions. 
This finding suggests that although people provided significantly fewer causal candidates for 
the mental health content condition than for the physical health condition in Pilot Study 3, 
this did not influence the magnitude of the belief-bias effect. Possible explanations for this 
finding will be discussed below. In addition, it must be noted that the non-attenuated belief-
bias effect was not due to weak manipulations of either believability or covariation. Rather, 
the explanations below will focus on the health type manipulation itself. 
Positivity 
The second new variable used in this thesis was positivity, with the following 
conditions: positive content and negative content. It was first hypothesized that the negative 
content statements would generate fewer causal candidates than the positive content 
statements, and this was supported by the results of Pilot Study 3. As a consequence, it was 
further hypothesized that the belief-bias effect should be attenuated for the negative content 
condition. 
There were main effects of believability and covariation. Participants rated believable 
scenarios as more likely to occur than unbelievable scenarios, and supporting covariation 
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scenarios as more likely to occur than the contradicting covariation scenarios. These two 
results were necessary for the belief-bias interaction to occur. Again, these effects served as 
important manipulation checks to ensure that the believability and covariation variables were 
influencing participants' responses. In addition, the significant two-way interaction between 
believability and covariation was observed. As noted, the belief-bias effect interaction 
indicated that pre-existing beliefs did impact reasoning, such that the covariation evidence 
was taken into account more for the believable cause-and-effect scenarios than for the 
unbelievable cause-and-effect scenarios. 
Unlike the health type variable, there was a significant difference in the size of the 
belief-bias effect across the two positivity conditions, such that, as hypothesized, the belief-
bias effect was attenuated for the negative condition compared to the positive condition. This 
finding is consistent with the Burnett et al. (2007) results and provides further support for the 
contention that differences in content can influence causal reasoning processing. What these 
results mean for the two-stage model of causal reasoning will be discussed further in the next 
section. 
The Two-Stage Model's Ability to Account for the Present Findings 
As noted, according to the two-stage model (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003), causal 
reasoning involves two distinct stages of processing. The recruitment of pre-existing beliefs 
relevant to the causal problem occurs during stage one processing. This recruitment is 
automatic and unconscious. The first stage is necessary in order to make causal problem 
solving quick and efficient (White, 1989). The conscious evaluation of new evidence relevant 
to the causal problem occurs during stage two processing. The strength of the two-stage 
model is that it provides an explicit mechanism for explaining the belief-bias effect. More 
specifically, the belief-bias effect occurs because people are biased to place heavy emphasis 
on their pre-existing beliefs as a source of causal information (Fugelsang & Thompson, 2000; 
Klauer et al., 2000). If such pre-existing beliefs are incorrect, they may lead individuals to 
disregard new and relevant information to the causal problem while seeking evidence to 
confirm their pre-existing beliefs. This bias places heavy emphasis on stage one processing, 
which negatively impacts stage two processing, such that if an individual does not believe 
that a cause has the ability to produce the effect, the evaluation of new relevant information 
during stage two processing may be ignored, leading to a biased conclusion based on those 
pre-existing beliefs. Although causal problem solving is still quick and efficient in these 
cases, it is nevertheless biased (i.e., incorrect causal conclusions will be made). 
The two-stage model of causal reasoning accounts for the attenuation of the belief-
bias effect found for the specificity and positivity variables in the following manner. The 
process by which the belief-bias effect may be reduced is such that the specific and negative 
content conditions, compared to the general and positive content conditions, recruit fewer 
pre-existing causal beliefs during stage one processing. The restriction in the number of pre-
existing beliefs recruited reduces the impact of stage one processing on stage two processing, 
because the new information has to be considered in conjunction with fewer pre-existing 
beliefs. The reduced impact on stage two reasoning then results in an attenuated belief-bias 
effect. In other words, by restricting the number of pre-existing beliefs relevant to the causal 
problem, the bias may be reduced because there are fewer pre-existing beliefs from which to 
choose and therefore reasoners are less likely to discount new information when reasoning 
with new information. The model may be able to currently predict the attenuation of the 
belief-bias for the specificity and positivity variables, however; it cannot currently account for 
the difference in results found between the health type variable and the positivity and 
specificity variables. Possible explanations for these differences will be discussed next. 
The results from the specificity and positivity variables suggest that the magnitude of 
the belief-bias effect may be manipulated through changes in content of the causal problem. 
However, the results produced from the health type variable were contradictory. There are 
two possible explanations for the difference in results between the specificity and positivity 
variables and the health type variable. The first possible explanation for the contradictory 
results deals with the recruitment of the pre-existing beliefs themselves. In Pilot Study 3 
there was a significant difference in the number of pre-existing-beliefs recruited between the 
two conditions for both the health type and positivity variables. The difference between the 
attenuation of the belief-bias effect for the positivity variable and the non-attenuation of the 
effect for the health type variable may be due to the difference between the number of pre-
existing beliefs recruited between the positive and negative conditions versus the difference 
of pre-existing beliefs recruited between the physical health and mental health conditions (the 
difference was larger in the former manipulation than in the latter). It is possible that the 
difference between the number of pre-existing beliefs recruited between the two health type 
conditions was not salient enough to make a difference in the size of the belief-bias effect. To 
test this hypothesis, an additional repeated measures /-test was conducted to determine if the 
difference in the recruitment of pre-existing beliefs between the two variables was 
significant. The analysis revealed that the difference in the recruitment of pre-existing beliefs 
between the two variables was not significant. The first possible explanation of the 
contradicting results from the thesis, that is that the difference between the number of pre-
existing beliefs recruited between the positive and negative conditions was greater than the 
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difference of pre-existing beliefs recruited between the physical health and mental health 
conditions, was not supported. 
A second possible explanation for the difference in findings may be due to the use of 
different variable types. On the one hand, the health type variable was categorical, such that 
the statements belonged either to the physical health condition or the mental health condition. 
On the other hand, the positivity variable was continuous, such that the statements could be 
evaluated on a graded scale, where the ratings ranged from highly negative to highly positive. 
It should also be noted that the Burnett et al. (2007) specificity variable was also a continuous 
variable (even though specificity ratings were not collected in the Burnett et al. study, a clear 
operational definition of degree of specificity was used to distinguish between statements that 
were specific in content from those that were general in content). 
It is proposed that the two independent variables, health type and positivity, were 
processed differently by the participants and that this can be accounted for by the two-stage 
model in the following manner. First, it is proposed that the health type variable was in fact 
processed as two distinct problem domains in the Experiment (i.e., physical health, and, 
independently, mental health), rather than being treated as one problem domain varying in 
content along a single dimension (i.e., physical health content on one end and mental health 
content on the other end of a 'health type' dimension). In other words, it is possible that the 
health type scenarios in the Experiment were not processed along three sources of variability; 
namely believability, covariation, and health type. Instead, the physical health scenarios and 
the mental health scenarios were likely being independently evaluated on only the 
believability and covariation sources of variability, and, as a result, no attenuation of the 
belief-bias effect was possible. Second, it is proposed that the positivity variable was 
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processed in the originally expected manner, that is, as one problem domain varying in 
content along a single dimension (i.e., negative content on one end and positive content on 
the other end of a 'positivity' dimension). In contrast to the health type variable, the positivity 
variable was processed along all three sources of variability (in this case believability, 
covariation, and positivity), such that an attenuation of the belief-bias effect was possible due 
to the influence of the variability of the positivity variable on the believability and covariation 
variables (the same general explanation would also account for the Burnett et al., 2007, 
results using the specificity variable). 
In summary, what seems to be a critical factor in whether the belief-bias effect can be 
attenuated is the nature of the content variable. If the content variable is categorical (as the 
health type variable was in the scenarios presented in the Experiment),then it seems that 
people treat the different levels as distinct and separate problem domains, which effectively 
makes only the believability and covariation variability available for processing. It is 
recognized that in the real world, mental and physical health may not be so discrete in terms 
of causal generation. There most likely are bi-directional causes between mental and physical 
health. It is therefore important to point out that any implications regarding the discrete 
nature of type of health may be limited to casual problems as they were presented in the 
Experiment presented in this thesis. In terms of the two-stage model, the pre-existing beliefs 
that are recruited during stage one processing for, say, the physical health content are only 
relevant for the further processing of the physical health content scenarios (and vice versa). 
In other words, there is no content variable variability available during stage two processing, 
and hence no way for the belief-bias effect to be attenuated. If, however, the content variable 
is continuous (as the positivity variable was in the scenarios presented in the Experiment), 
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then it seems that people treat the different levels as variability on a single problem domain. 
In such cases, there is a third source of variability that is processed in addition to the 
believability and covariation variability. In terms of the two-stage model, the pre-existing 
beliefs that are recruited during stage one processing are relevant for the further processing 
for both levels of the content variable, because the content variable is treated as a single 
problem domain. In other words, there is much content variable variability available during 
stage two processing, and hence it is possible for the belief-bias effect to be attenuated. 
To test the hypothesis that the current health type variable did not provide a relevant 
source of variability for the attenuation of the belief-bias effect due to its categorical nature, 
the following is proposed. Each health type would be transformed into a continuous variable 
by finding scenarios that vary on either the dimension of mental health content or the 
dimension of physical health content. For example, for the mental health dimension, the 
continuum would range from "contributing to good mental health" to "inhibiting good mental 
health" and would include such topics as: substance abuse (inhibiting) or exercising 
(contributing). The physical health dimension would range from "contributing to good 
physical health" to "inhibiting good physical health" and would include such topics as: stress 
(inhibiting) or social support (contributing). The variability along a single dimension (e.g., 
mental health content) would allow for the necessary variability the two-stage model needs to 
attenuate the belief-bias effect. If the two types of health content are successfully transformed 
into continuous variables, it is predicted that the low end of each dimension (e.g., 'inhibiting 
good mental/physical health' content) would serve to attenuate the belief-bias by restricting 
the number of pre-existing beliefs recruited during stage one processing. Here it is assumed 
that the 'inhibiting good mental/physical' content is more specific, and the 'contributing to 
good mental/physical health' content is more general, thereby recruited a greater number of 
pre-existing beliefs. This hypothesis is consistent with the results using the positivity variable 
of the present thesis and the specificity variable of Burnett et al. (2007). A second proposed 
experiment would attempt to replicate the findings of this thesis by introducing a novel 
continuous content variable. If the above hypothesis is true, that the variability in the 
continuous content variable is important to the attenuation of the belief-bias effect, then the 
same pattern of results as observed for the positivity and specificity variables should be 
observed for the new continuous content variable. Again, it is expected that the end of the 
new content variable dimension that recruits fewer pre-existing beliefs will attenuate the 
belief-bias effect, an expectation that is consistent with the results using the positivity 
variable of the present thesis and the specificity variable of Burnett et al. (2007). 
A third proposed experiment would test the above hypothesis that continuous 
variables are necessary to attenuate the belief-bias effect by using a novel categorical content 
variable. If the two conditions of the categorical content variable are being processed 
independently of each other, then no attenuation of the belief-bias effect should be observed, 
as was the case with the health type variable of the present thesis. 
How Other Models of Causal Reasoning May or May Not Account for the Present Findings 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two other classes of models that have 
been proposed to provide an account of causal reasoning processing. First, covariation 
models, such as Cheng and Novick's (1990, 1992) probabilistic contrast model, suggest that 
people have an inherent ability to automatically process statistical causal relationships in the 
environment. This model explains causal processing through covariation, or the regularity of 
events co-occurring as causal (i.e., the more often two events co-occur, the more likely it is 
they will be perceived as causally related) (Kelly, 1973; Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 
1990, 1992; Wasserman, 1990). This model has had much success in predicting causality 
based on covariation, and as noted previously the model does not allow for the use of 
mechanism-information or pre-existing beliefs (White, 1989) as a source of causal 
information. Because pre-existing beliefs are not incorporated into this model of causal 
reasoning, this model does poorly in explaining the belief-bias effect and how it may be 
attenuated, and therefore the results reported in this thesis and in Burnett et al. (2007). If the 
use of pre-existing beliefs as a source of causal information were included in the model, it 
would resemble the two-stage model of Fugelsang and Thompson (2003). 
The other class of model important to the explanation of causal reasoning processing 
is the concept-based model. This type of model is exemplified by White's (1989) causal 
powers model. This model gives preference to pre-existing beliefs as a source of causal 
information when making cause-and-effect judgments. The incorporation of pre-existing 
beliefs as a source of causal information can explain the efficiency of causal reasoning, and 
the ability to make causal judgments after only one observation, something that covariation 
models cannot do. Pre-existing beliefs allow the appropriate mechanism-information to be 
recruited and putative causal candidates for the effect narrowed down quickly. However, 
White's causal powers model focuses on the use of pre-existing beliefs alone as a source of 
causal information, not allowing for the use of covariation information. Because the model 
does not incorporate both sources of information, it is not sufficient to explain the belief-bias 
effect or how it may be attenuated, as reported in this thesis or by Burnett et al. (2007). 
Again, if this model were to include such a mechanism, it would resemble the two-stage 
model of Fugelsang and Thompson (2003). 
It is evident that both sources of causal information, pre-existing beliefs and 
covariation, are important to causal reasoning processing. Because of this, covariation 
models and concept-based models are insufficient to explain causal reasoning processing and 
the belief-bias effect and the conditions in which it may be attenuated. The two-stage model 
(Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003) of causal reasoning seems to be adequate to sufficiently 
explain the incorporation of both pre-existing beliefs and covariation information as sources 
of causal information. The two-stage model also provides a framework to explain the belief-
bias effect and the conditions under which it may be attenuated. However, the results 
reported in the present thesis (and possibly from the additional experiments proposed above) 
suggest that the type of variable used to make content manipulations is important in 
determining whether the belief-bias effect can be attenuated. Thus, the two-stage model, as 
currently proposed, must accommodate the fact that the attenuation of the belief-bias effect 
may only be made with content manipulations based on continuous variables. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Eight Health Type Cause-and-Effect Scenarios Used 
in the Experiment 
Condition M 
1 Physical/Believable 4.65 1.49 
2 Physical/Believable 5.75 1.23 
Average for Condition 5.20 1.36 
3 Mental/Believable 5.38 1.30 
4 Mental/Believable 4.85 1.46 
Average for Condition 5.12 1.38 
5 Physical/Unbelievable 2.73 1.94 
6 Physical/Unbelievable 1.57 .91 
Average for Condition 2.15 1.42 
7 Mental/Unbelievable 1.75 1.17 
8 Mental/Unbelievable 2.53 1.47 
Average for Condition 2.14 1.32 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Eight Positivity Cause-and-EJfect Scenarios Used in 
the Experiment 
Condition M SD 
1 Positive/Believable 6.30 .79 
2 Positive/Believable 5.63 1.35 
Average for Condition 5.97 1.07 
3 Negative/Believable 5.83 1.23 
4 Negative/Believable 6.23 .86 
Average for Condition 6.03 1.05 
5 Positi ve/U nbelievable 1.40 .97 
6 Positive/Unbelievable 2.27 1.34 
Average for Condition 1.83 1.15 
7 Negative/Unbelievable 2.00 1.34 
8 Negative/Unbelievable 1.77 1.04 
Average for Condition 1.88 1.19 
Physical Health Type 
•. . • . 
m PP 
Believable Unbelievable 
• Support 
• Contradict 
Mental Health Type 
Believable Unbelievable 
• Support 
0 Contradict 
Figure 1. Three-way analysis between believability, covariation, and health type 
Positivity 
60 
O Support 
• Contradict 
• Support 
S Contradict 
Figure 2. Three-way analysis between believability, covariation, and positivity. 
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Appendix 1 
Complete list of items used for Pilot Study 1, Chosen Items for the Health Type scenarios in 
the Experiment are indicated with an * 
Ph ysical/B elie vable: 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of heart disease in women. You have a 
hypothesis that heart disease in women may be due to menopause. How believable do 
you think it is that heart disease in women may be due to menopause? 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a 
hypothesis that good health may be due to abstaining from alcohol. How believable 
do you think it is that good health may be due to abstaining from alcohol? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis 
that good health may be due to having low blood pressure. How believable do you 
think it is that good health may be due to having low blood pressure? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis 
that good health may be due to having strong muscles. How believable do you think it 
is that good health may be due to having strong muscles? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of a heart attack. You have a 
hypothesis that a heart attack may be due to depression. How believable do you think 
it is that a heart attack may be due to depression? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of arthritis. You have a hypothesis that 
arthritis may be due to cracking your knuckles. How believable do you think it is that 
arthritis may be due to cracking your knuckles? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis 
that good health may be due to herbal remedy use. How believable do you think it is 
that good health may be due to herbal remedy use? 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a 
hypothesis that good health may be due to vigilant exercising. How believable do you 
think it is that good health may be due to vigilant exercising? 
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Physical/Unbelievable: 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of high levels of cholesterol. You 
have a hypothesis that high cholesterol may be due to a decrease in fat intake. How 
believable do you think it is that high cholesterol may be due to a decrease in fat 
intake? 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of ulcers. You have a hypothesis 
that ulcers may be due to feeling relaxed. How believable do you think it is that ulcers 
may be due to feeling relaxed? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of improved health. You have a 
hypothesis that improved health may be due to switching from light cigarettes to 
regular cigarettes. How believable do you think it is that improved health may be due 
to switching from light cigarettes to regular cigarettes? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis 
that good health may be due to increasing the number of cigarettes smoked per day. 
How believable do you think it is that good health may be due to increasing the 
number of cigarettes smoked per day? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of diabetes. You have a hypothesis that 
diabetes may be due to eating broccoli. How believable do you think it is that diabetes 
may be due to eating broccoli? 
Mental/Believable: 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of mental illness. You have a 
hypothesis that mental illness may be due to character flaws. How believable do you 
think it is that mental illness may be due to character flaws? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of violent behaviour. You have a 
hypothesis that violent behaviour may be due to a mental illness. How believable do 
you think it is that violent behaviour may be due to mental illness? 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of dementia. You have a hypothesis 
that dementia may be due to increasing age. How believable do you think it is that 
dementia may be due to increasing age? 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an increase in positivity in a 
depressed person. You have a hypothesis that the increase in positivity may be due to 
taking anti-depressant medication. How believable do you think it is that the increase 
in positivity may be due to taking anti-depressant medication? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of your teenage sister's mood swings. 
You have a hypothesis that the mood swings may be due to depression. How 
believable do you think it is that the mood swings may be due to depression? 
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Mental/Unbelievable: 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an addiction. You have a 
hypothesis that addiction may be due to having lots of willpower. How believable do 
you think it is that addiction may be due to having lots of willpower? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of violence in epileptics. You have a 
hypothesis that violence in epileptics may be due to watching television. How 
believable do you think it is that violence in epileptics may be due to watching 
television? 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an increase in depressive symptoms. 
You have a hypothesis that an increase in depressive symptoms ay be due to talking 
about the disorder. How believable do you think it is that an increase in depressive 
symptoms may be due to talking about the disorder? 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of intelligence. You have a 
hypothesis that intelligence may be due to a mental illness. How believable do you 
think it is that intelligence may be due to a mental illness? 
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Appendix 1 
Pilot 2 Positivity Questionnaire for the collection of Positivity Ratings 
Instructions: 
Note: Please read and sign the enclosed Consent Form before continuing. 
In the following questionnaire you will be asked to make 27 ratings about several statements, 
specifically, how positive do you think they are. 
In the space next to the statement, please rate how positive you think the overall concept is. Please 
assign each statement a rating on the scale provided, where 1 means the concept is negative, and a 7 
means the concept is positive. The more positive the concept, the higher the value you should assign 
to that scenario. 
How positive do you think of the following? 
NEGATIVE NEUTRAL POSITIVE 
1 - — ----- 2 - — 3 4 -- —- 5 6 7 
Blindness Global Warming 
Cardiovascular Disease Recovery from illness 
Pneumonia Liver Failure 
Good Health Good heart health 
Male Sterility Pollution 
Physical Energy Lung Cancer 
Recovery from heart disease Good eye health 
Recovery from Cancer Longevity 
Weight Loss Kidney Failure 
Environmental Health Anorexia 
Heart Diasease Headaches 
Good Lung Health Cancer Progression 
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Appendix 1 
Complete list of items used for Pilot Study 2, Chosen Items for the Positivity scenarios in the 
Experiment are indicated with an * 
Unbelievable/Negative: 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pneumonia. You have a hypothesis 
that pneumonia may be due to coughing. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pollution. You have a hypothesis that 
pollution may be due to ozone layer depletion 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of anorexia. You have a hypothesis that 
anorexia may be due to nausea 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of male sterility. You have a hypothesis 
that male sterility may be due to wearing condoms. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of cardiovascular disease. You have a 
hypothesis that cardiovascular disease may be due to heartburn. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of kidney failure. You have a hypothesis 
that the kidney failure may be due to eating too much sugar. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of liver failure. You have a hypothesis that 
liver failure may be due to stress. 
Unbelievable/Positive: 
(*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good lung health. You have a 
hypothesis that good lung health may be due to inhaling asbestos. 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good heart health. You have a 
hypothesis that a healthy heart may be due to drinking green tea. 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good eye health. You have a hypothesis 
that good eye health may be due to eating carrots. 
(*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of physical energy. You have a 
hypothesis that physical energy may be due to allergies 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of weight loss. You have a hypothesis that 
weight loss may be due to eating cake. 
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• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of longevity. You have a hypothesis that 
longevity may be due to smoking 
Believable/Negative 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pneumonia. You have a hypothesis 
that pneumonia may be due to a lung infection. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of global warming. You have a hypothesis 
that global warming may be due to pollution. 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of lung cancer. You have a hypothesis 
that lung cancer may be due to smoking. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of someone's cancer progression. You 
have a hypothesis that their cancer progression may be due to stress. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of heart disease. You have a hypothesis 
that heart disease may be due to having diabetes. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of blindness. You have a hypothesis that 
blindness may be due to having diabetes. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of headaches. You have a hypothesis that 
headaches may be due to emotional distress. 
Believable/Positive 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of environmental health. You have a 
hypothesis that good environmental health may be due to recycling 
• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good heart health. You have a 
hypothesis that good heart health may be due to a good diet. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis that 
good health may be due to having a healthy diet. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of someone's recovery from an illness. 
You have a hypothesis that this person's recovery from an illness may be due to taking 
penicillin. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of someone's recovery from cancer. You 
have a hypothesis that their recovery from cancer may be due to chemotherapy treatment 
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• (*)Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of someone's recovery from heart 
disease. You have a hypothesis that their recovery from heart disease may be due to 
having a heart transplant. 
• Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of longevity. You have a hypothesis that 
longevity may be due to abstaining from alcohol. 
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Appendix 1 
The Causal Generation Task used in Pilot Study 3 
For each of the following statements, try to come up with as many alternative causes for the 
effect as you can. You will have two minutes for each statement to try to write down as 
many as you can. The researcher will let you know when to go on to the next statement. An 
example is given below: 
Example: 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of anxiety. You have a hypothesis that anxiety 
may be due to public speaking. 
Potential Alternative causes: stress, chemical imbalance, drinking too much coffee, etc. 
Please let the researcher know when you are ready to begin. 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis that 
good health may be due to abstaining from alcohol. 
(PB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pneumonia. You have a hypothesis that 
pneumonia may be due to coughing. 
(NegUB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of ulcers. You have a hypothesis that ulcers 
may be due to feeling relaxed. 
(PUB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of dementia. You have a hypothesis that 
dementia may be due to increasing age. 
(MB) 
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Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of physical energy. You have a hypothesis that 
physical energy may be due to having allergies. 
(PosUB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of lung cancer. You have a hypothesis that 
lung cancer may be due to smoking. 
(NegB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good heart health. You have a hypothesis 
that good heart health may be due to eating a good diet. 
(PosB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of high levels of cholesterol. You have a 
hypothesis that high levels of cholesterol may be due to decrease in fat intake. 
(PUB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis that 
good health may be due to vigilant exercising. 
(PB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of someone's recovery from heart disease. 
You have a hypothesis that their recovery may be due to having a heart transplant 
(PosB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pneumonia. You have a hypothesis that 
pneumonia may be due to having a lung infection. 
(NegB) 
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Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good lung health. You have a hypothesis 
that good lung health may be due to inhaling asbestos. 
(PosUB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of anorexia. You have a hypothesis that 
anorexia may be due to nausea. 
(NegUB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an addiction. You have a hypothesis that 
addiction is caused by having lots of willpower. 
(MUB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of intelligence. You have a hypothesis that 
intelligence may be due to a mental illness. 
(MUB) 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an increase in positivity in a depressed 
person. You have a hypothesis that the increase in positivity may be due to taking anti-
depressant medication. 
(MB) 
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Appendix 1 
Belief-Bias Questionnaire used in the Experiment 
Instructions 
Please complete the following information before we begin. 
Subject #: 
Gender: 
Age: 
Year of studies: 
Note: Please read and sign the enclosed Consent Form before continuing. 
In the following experiment you will be asked to make 16 judgments about the relationship 
between two variables, a potential cause and a potential effect. 
You will be asked to rate the degree to which you think the two variables are causally linked 
(i.e., the degree to which you believe that the first variable has the potential to cause the 
second to occur). To do this, you will be asked to assign to each scenario a value from the 
scale provided, where 1 means that the given cause is not a likely cause of the given effect, 
and 7 means that the given cause is a highly likely cause of the given effect. The more you 
think the provided cause produced the stated effect, the higher the value you should assign to 
that scenario. An example scenario is given below: 
Imagine you are an economist who is trying to determine the cause of a thriving economy. 
You have a hypothesis that the thriving economy may be due to low taxes. In order to test this 
theory, you survey 10 countries with thriving economies, and 10 countries that do not have 
thriving economies. A thorough investigation revealed the following information: of the 10 
countries with thriving economies, 9 had lower taxes; of the 10 countries that do not have 
thriving economies, 1 had lower taxes. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that lower taxes caused the 
thriving economies? 
For the following 16 scenarios, please rate how likely you think the provided cause 
produced the stated effect. Please provide these ratings in the order that the 
scenarios are presented. Do not go back and change any of your answers. 
1 2 
Not 
likely 
3 4 5 
Moderately 
likely 
7 
Highly 
likely 
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MBSl 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of dementia. You have a hypothesis that dementia may 
be due to increasing age. To test this theory, you gather statistics for 10 people who had dementia 
and 10 people who did not have dementia. Your investigation revealed that 9 of the 10 people who 
had dementia were elderly; 1 of the 10 people who did not have dementia was elderly. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that dementia may be due to increasing 
age? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
UBPOSC1 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good lung health. You have a hypothesis that good 
lung health may be due to inhaling asbestos. To test this theory you survey 10 people who have good 
lung health and 10 people who do not have good lung health. Your investigation reveals that 1 out of 
the 10 people who have good lung health have inhaled asbestos; 9 out of the 10 people who do not 
have good lung health have inhaled asbestos. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that good lung health may be due to 
inhaling asbestos? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
MUBC2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of intelligence. You have a hypothesis that high 
intelligence scores may be due to a mental illness. To test this theory, you survey 10 people with high 
intelligence scores and 10 people with low intelligence scores. Your investigation revealed that 1 of 
the 10 people with high intelligence scores had a mental illness; 9 of the 10 people who had low 
intelligence scores had a mental illness. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that intelligence may be due to a mental 
illness? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
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BP0SS2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of someone's recovery from heart disease. You have a 
hypothesis that their recovery from heart disease may be due to having a heart transplant. To test this 
theory you survey 10 people who have recovered from heart disease and 10 people who have not 
recovered from heart disease. Your investigation reveals that 9 out of 10 people who have recovered 
from heart disease have had a heart transplant; 1 out of 10 people who have not recovered from heart 
disease have had a heart transplant. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that recovery from heart disease may be 
due to having a heart transplant? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
UPOSS2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of physical energy. You have a hypothesis that 
physical energy may be due to having allergies. To test this theory you survey 10 people who have 
lots of physical energy and 10 people who do not have lots of physical energy. Your investigation 
reveals that 9 of the 10 people who have lots of physical energy also have allergies; 1 out of the 10 
people who do not have lots of physical energy also have allergies. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that physical energy may be due to having 
allergies? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
PHBS1 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis that good health 
may be due to abstaining from alcohol. To test this theory, you survey 10 people who are in good 
health and 10 people who are not in good health. Your investigation reveals that 9 of the 10 people 
who are in good health abstain from alcohol; 1 of the 10 people who are not in good health abstains 
from alcohol. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that good health may be due to abstaining 
from alcohol? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
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BPOSCl 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good heart health. You have a hypothesis that good 
heart health may be due to eating a good diet. To test this theory you survey 10 people who have good 
heart health and 10 people who do not have good heart health. Your investigation reveals that 1 out of 
10 people who have good heart health also eat a good diet; 9 out of 10 people who do not have good 
heart health also eat a good diet. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that good heart health may be due to 
eating a good diet? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
BNEGC2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of lung cancer. You have a hypothesis that lung cancer 
may be due to smoking. To test this theory you survey 10 people who have lung cancer and 10 people 
who do not have lung cancer. Your investigation reveals that 1 out of the 10 people who have lung 
cancer smoke; 9 out of the 10 people who do not have lung cancer smoke. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that lung cancer may be due to smoking? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
UNEGC1 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pneumonia. You have a hypothesis that pneumonia 
may be due to coughing. To test this theory, you survey 10 people who have pneumonia and 10 
people who do not have pneumonia. Your investigation reveals that 1 of the 10 people who have 
pneumonia cough frequently; 9 out of the 10 people who do not have pneumonia cough frequently. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that pneumonia may be due to coughing? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
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BNEGSl 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pneumonia. You have a hypothesis that pneumonia 
may be due to having a lung infection. To test this theory you survey 10 people who have pneumonia 
and 10 people who do not have pneumonia. Your investigation reveals that 9 out of the 10 people 
who have pneumonia also have a lung infection; 1 out of the 10 people who do not have pneumonia 
also have a lung infection. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that pneumonia may be due to having a 
lung infection? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
UNEGS2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of anorexia. You have a hypothesis that anorexia may 
be due to having nausea. To test this theory, you survey 10 people who are anorexic and 10 people 
who are not anorexic. Your investigation reveals that 9 out of the 10 people who are anorexic also 
have frequent nausea; 1 out of the 10 people who are not anorexic also have frequent nausea. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that anorexia may be due to having 
nausea? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
PHBC2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis that good health 
may be due to vigilant exercising. To test this theory, you survey 10 people who are in good health 
and 10 people who are not in good health. Your investigation reveals that 1 of the 10 people who are 
in good health exercise vigilantly; 9 of the 10 people who are not in good health exercise vigilantly. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that good health may be due to vigilant 
exercise? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
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PHUBS1 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of high levels of cholesterol. You have a hypothesis 
that high cholesterol levels may be due to a decrease in fat intake. To test this theory, you gather 
statistics for 10 people who have high cholesterol levels and 10 people who have low cholesterol 
levels. An investigation of the statistics revealed that 9 of the 10 people with high cholesterol levels 
eat low fat diets; 1 of the 10 people who have low levels of cholesterol levels eat low fat diets. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that high cholesterol levers may be due to 
a decrease in fat intake? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
MBC2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an increase in positivity in a depressed person. You 
have a hypothesis that the increase in positivity may be due to taking anti-depressant medication. To 
test this theory, you survey 10 depressed people taking medication, and 10 depressed people not on 
medication. Your investigation revealed that 1 of the 10 depressed persons taking medication had an 
increase in positivity; 9 of the 10 depressed persons not on medication had an increase in positivity. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that an increase in positivity in a depressed 
person may be due to taking anti-depressant medication? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
MUB SI 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an addiction. You have a hypothesis that addiction 
may be due to having lots of willpower. To test this theory, you investigate 10 people who have an 
addiction and 10 people who do not have an addiction. Your investigation revealed that 9 of the 10 
people who had an addiction had lots of willpower; 1 of the 10 people who did not have an adduction 
had lots of willpower. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that an addiction may be due to having lots 
of willpower? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not Moderately Highly 
likely likely likely 
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PHUBC2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of ulcers. You have a hypothesis that ulcers may be 
due to feeling relaxed. To test this theory, you survey 10 people who have ulcers and 10 people who 
do not have ulcers. Your investigation revealed that 1 of the 10 people who have ulcers feel relaxed 
most of the time; 9 of the 10 people who do not have ulcers feel relaxed most of the time. 
Given the above information, how likely do you think it is that ulcers may be due to feeling relaxed? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not 
likely 
Moderately 
likely 
Highly 
likely 
**Thank you for your participation4* 
Please return the questionnaire booklet and the signed consent form 
to the research assistant and pick up a copy of the information sheet 
* * • 
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Appendix 1 
Believability Ratings Questionnaire used in the Experiment 
Instructions: ***For each of the following statements, please rate how believable you think it 
is that the cause produced the effect on a scale of 1-7 (1 = highly unbelievable; 7 = highly 
believable). 
UNBl 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pneumonia. You have a hypothesis that pneumonia 
may be due to coughing. 
How believable do you think it is that pneumonia may be due to coughing? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
PUB9 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of high levels of cholesterol. You have a hypothesis 
that high cholesterol levels may be due to a decrease in fat intake. 
How believable do you think it is that high levels of cholesterol may be due to a decrease in fat 
intake? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
POSB27 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of someone's recovery from heart disease. You have a 
hypothesis that their recovery from heart disease may be due to having a heart transplant. 
How believable do you think it is that their recovery from heart disease may be due to having a heart 
transplant? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
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MB16 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of dementia. You have a hypothesis that dementia may 
be due to increasing age. 
How believable do you think it is that dementia may be due to increasing in age? 
1 
Highly 
UnBelievable 
4 
Moderately 
Believable 
7 
Highly 
Believable 
PB2 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis that good health 
may be due to abstaining from alcohol. 
How believable do you think it is that good health may be due to abstaining from alcohol? 
1 
Highly 
UnBelievable 
4 
Moderately 
Believable 
7 
Highly 
Believable 
NEGUB3 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of anorexia. You have a hypothesis that anorexia may 
be due to nausea. 
How believable do you think it is that anorexia may be due to nausea? 
1 2 
Highly 
UnBelievable 
3 4 5 
Moderately 
Believable 
7 
Highly 
Believable 
PUB 10 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of ulcers. You have a hypothesis that ulcers may be 
due to feeling relaxed. 
How believable do you think it is that ulcers may be due to feeling relaxed? 
1 2 
Highly 
UnBelievable 
3 4 5 
Moderately 
Believable 
7 
Highly 
Believable 
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POSUBIl 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of physical energy. You have a hypothesis that 
physical energy may be due to allergies. 
How believable do you think it is that physical energy may be due to allergies? 
1 
Highly 
UnBelievable 
4 
Moderately 
Believable 
7 
Highly 
Believable 
MB 17 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an increase in positivity in a depressed person. You 
have a hypothesis that the increase in positivity may be due to taking anti-depressant medication. 
How believable do you think it is that the increase in positivity may be due to taking anti-depressant 
medication? 
1 
Highly 
UnBelievable 
4 
Moderately 
Believable 
7 
Highly 
Believable 
POSB23 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good heart health. You have a hypothesis that good 
heart health may be due to a good diet. 
How believable do you think it is that good heart health may be due to having a good diet? 
1 
Highly 
UnBelievable 
4 
Moderately 
Believable 
7 
Highly 
Believable 
MUB 19 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of an addiction. You have a hypothesis that addiction 
may be due to having lots of willpower. 
How believable do you think it is that addiction may be due to having lots of willpower? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
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NEGB 14 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of pneumonia. You have a hypothesis that pneumonia 
may be due to a lung infection. 
How believable do you think it is that pneumonia may be due to a lung infection? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
NEGB 16 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of lung cancer. You have a hypothesis that lung cancer 
may be due to smoking. 
How believable do you think it is that lung cancer may be due to smoking? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
PB8 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good health. You have a hypothesis that good health 
may be due to vigilant exercising. 
How believable do you think it is that good health may be due to vigilant exercising? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
POSUB8 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of good lung health. You have a hypothesis that good 
lung health may be due to inhaling asbestos. 
How believable do you think it is that good lung health may be due to inhaling asbestos? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
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MUB22 
Imagine you are trying to determine the cause of intelligence. You have a hypothesis that high 
intelligence scores may be due to a mental illness. 
How believable do you think it is that intelligence may be due to having a mental illness? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Highly Moderately Highly 
UnBelievable Believable Believable 
